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by making the appellate divisions their courts of last resort.
Elaine T. Ryan
Third party consent to warrantless police search of jointly occupied premises valid notwithstanding contemporaneous objection
of co-occupant.
The fourth amendment 2 7 prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures generally requires that government officials
obtain a valid warrant prior to conducting a search.24 The need for
a warrant is obviated, however, if valid consent 24 9 to the search is
24. The fourth amendment provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 12.
248 See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301-02 (1967); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
643-60 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393-94 (1914); 1 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 3.1, at 438-39 (1978); Comment, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 1056, 1057 (1977).
Warrantless searches are deemed unreasonable per se, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 219 (1973); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) (citing Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)), unless they are predicated on one of the established exceptions to the warrant requirement. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499,
509-10 (1978) (exigency); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977) (border
searches); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372-76 (1976) (inventory search of automobile); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 165-66 (1974) (consent); United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35 (1973) (search incident to traffic arrest); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447-48 (1973) (dangerous weapon); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 465-71 (1971) (open view); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48-52 (1970) (automobile); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (search incident to lawful arrest);
People v. Howard, 50 N.Y.2d 583, 592-93, 408 N.E.2d 908, 914, 430 N.Y.S.2d 578, 585 (1980)
(abandonment); People v. Kuhn, 33 N.Y.2d 203, 209-10, 306 N.E.2d 777, 780, 351 N.Y.S.2d
649, 653-54 (1973) (airport searches); cf. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 395 (1978) (no
scene-of-crime exception). Evidence seized as a result of an illegal search will be suppressed
pursuant to the exclusionary rule. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
1'9 In order to be valid, consent to a warrantless search must be made voluntarily. See,
e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973). Whether consent is voluntary "is
a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances." Id. at 227.
Some of the factors to be considered in determining the voluntary nature of a defendant's
consent include:
the youth of the accused, his lack of education, or his low intelligence, the lack of
any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights, the length of detention, the
repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, and the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep.
Id. at 226 (citations omitted).
Consent has been rendered involuntary by the presence of a disproportionate number
of police in relation to the number of defendants, People v. Gonzalez, 39 N.Y.2d 122, 124,
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obtained.250 Consent sufficient to legitimize a warrantless search
need not be obtained from the person against whom the search is
directed. 251 Rather, it has been held that in the absence of the sub-

ject of the search a third party with joint control over the premises
347 N.E.2d 575, 577, 383 N.Y.S.2d 215, 217 (1976), and by the use of mental coercion by the
police, People v. Litt, 71 App. Div. 2d 926, 926, 419 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d Dep't 1979).
Although the failure to advise the defendant of his right to withhold consent is not dispositive of the question of voluntariness, it is one factor to be taken into account. Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 227; People v. Gonzalez, 39 N.Y.2d 122, 130, 347 N.E.2d 575, 581,
383 N.Y.S.2d 215, 221 (1976); People v. Kuhn, 33 N.Y.2d 203, 209, 306 N.E.2d 777, 780, 351
N.Y.S.2d 649, 653 (1973).
250 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169-72 (1974); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 & n.22 (1967); People v.
Kuhn, 33 N.Y.2d 203, 208, 306 N.E.2d 777, 779, 351 N.Y.S.2d 649, 652 (1973). When it is
claimed that valid consent obviated the need for a search warrant, the prosecution bears the
burden of proving that the consent was voluntary. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543,
548 (1968). See generally note 249 supra.
25 See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974) (paramour consented to
search of bedroom which she shared with defendant); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740
(1969) (consent obtained from one who shared the searched property with the defendant);
United States v. Wixom, 441 F.2d 623, 625 (7th Cir. 1971) (owner of premises shared with
defendant validly consented to its search); People v. Carter, 30 N.Y.2d 279, 282, 283 N.E.2d
746, 746-47, 332 N.Y.S.2d 865, 866 (1972) (wife consented to search of the marital home).
See generally W. RINGEL, SEARcHEs & SEizURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 9.5(c), (f) (2d
ed. 1980).
In upholding the validity of third-party consents, many early cases employed either an
"agency" or "relationship" approach. See, e.g., Lucero v. Donovan, 354 F.2d 16, 21 (9th Cir.
1965); Roberts v. United States, 332 F.2d 892, 895-96 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
980 (1965); United States v. Eldridge, 302 F.2d 463, 465 (4th Cir. 1962). Under the agency
approach, if the defendant had expressly or impliedly authorized the third party to consent
to a police search, the search was held to be valid. See, e.g., Lucero v. Donovan, 354 F.2d 16
(9th Cir. 1965). Similarly, under the relationship approach, if the implicated party had some
strong relationship to the third party, the consent was deemed valid. See, e.g., Stein v.
United States, 166 F.2d 851, 853 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 844 (1948). Subsequently,
the validity of third party consent was predicated upon the consenting party's possession
and control of the searched premises. See, e.g., United States v. Kellerman, 431 F.2d 319,
324 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970); Galbraith v. United States, 387 F.2d 617,
618 (10th Cir. 1968). In applying the "possession and control" test, many courts focused on
the third party's relationship to the premises being searched, rather than to the owner of
the premises, see, e.g., Carlton v. United States, 391 F.2d 684, 686 (8th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 1014 (1969); Burge v. United States, 342 F.2d 408, 413 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 829 (1965). The Supreme Court, however, has rejected the contention that
a third party's right to consent to a search of jointly used premises is predicated on his
property interest in the premises. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974).
The Matlock Court stated:
(The third-party consent rule] rests rather on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the
inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of
their number might permit the common area to be searched.
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may consent.2 52 It was unsettled, however, whether the third
party's consent would validate a warrantless search if the co-inhabitant is present and objects to the search of the jointly controlled
25
in People v. Cosme,2 " the New York Court
premises.'" Recently,
of Appeals resolved this uncertainty, holding that a third party
with the right of equal access to or control over premises could
consent to a warrantless police search notwithstanding the objections of a co-occupant.2 55
In Cosme, an argument between the defendant and his fiancee,
Hennessey, prompted Hennessey to report to the police that
Cosine kept a gun and a quantity of cocaine in the apartment they
151

See People v. Carter, 30 N.Y.2d 279, 283 N.E.2d 746, 332 N.Y.S.2d 865 (1972). In

Carter, the Court of Appeals adopted the view that a third party's ability to consent is
based upon an independent right "to authorize entry into the premises where she lives and
of which she [has] control." Id. at 282, 283 N.E.2d at 747, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 866 (quoting
Roberts v. United States, 332 F.2d 892, 897 (8th Cir. 1964)). The Carter Court thereby
rejected the "agency" or "relationship" approach utilized by some courts to uphold the validity of third party consents. 30 N.Y.2d at 282, 283 N.E.2d at 746-47, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 866.
Having decided that the authority to permit police entry is a personal right stemming from
the individual's right of access to the premises, the Court subsequently had no difficulty
upholding the validity of a landlord's consent to a search of her tenant's bedroom where the
room was shared with the landlord's young son. See People v. Wood, 31 N.Y.2d 975, 293
N.E.2d 559, 341 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1973) (per curiam). The Wood Court reasoned that because
the room was not used exclusively by the defendant, he had no reasonable expectation of
privacy. Therefore, the landlord's right to enter her son's bedroom validated her consent to
a search of the room. Id. at 976, 293 N.E.2d at 560, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 311.
The validity of a third party's consent to a search of effects, as opposed to premises, has
also been recognized. In Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969), incriminating evidence was
seized from a duffel bag which was shared by the defendant and his cousin. The search had
been consented to by the cousin in the defendant's absence. In holding the consent valid,
the Court reasoned that by allowing another party to keep and use his property, the defendant assumed the risk that such party would allow the police to inspect it. Id. at 740.
"I Compare United States v. Robinson, 479 F.2d 300, 303 (7th Cir. 1973) and Lucero v.
Donovan, 354 F.2d 16, 21 (9th Cir. 1965) and People v. Mortimer, 46 App. Div. 2d 275, 277,
361 N.Y.S.2d 955, 958 (4th Dep't 1974) with United States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684, 687-88
(6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978) and People v. Dolan, 95 Misc. 2d 470, 475,
408 N.Y.S.2d 249, 252 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1978). See also United States v. Matlock, 415
U.S. 164 (1974). In Matlock the Supreme Court stated that "the consent of one who possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared." Id. at 170 (emphasis added); accord, People
v. Howland, 62 App. Div. 2d 1094, 1096, 405 N.Y.S.2d 131, 134 (3d Dep't 1978); People v.
Mortimer, 46 App. Div. 2d 275, 276, 361 N.Y.S.2d 955, 956 (4th Dep't 1974). The Sixth
Circuit, however, has recently stated that the Matlock decision imposed no limitation on a
third party's right to consent in the presence of his co-occupant. See United States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978); note 274 infra.
2- 48 N.Y.2d 286, 397 N.E.2d 1319, 422 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1979), aft'g, 63 App. Div. 2d
1123, 405 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (1st Dep't 1978) (mem.).
255 48 N.Y.2d at 292, 397 N.E.2d at 1322, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
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shared. " 6 Hennessey provided the responding officers with a key
to the apartment and a diagram indicating the location of the contraband.25 7 Upon entering the apartment, the police seized the proand searched the closet
testing defendant and a companion,
which Hennessey had indicated was the repository of the
contraband.5
Based upon the evidence seized, Cosine was indicted for criminal possession of a gun and narcotics. The defendant moved to
suppress the evidence on the grounds, inter alia, that the police
had not obtained valid consent for 'the search.26 0 Denying the motion, the trial court concluded that Hennessey's "unfettered access
to and joint occupancy of" Cosine's apartment gave her the authority to consent to a search despite the defendant's objection. 261 The
Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the defendant's
subsequent conviction without opinion, and the defendant
appealed.2 6 2
In an opinion authored by Judge Gabrielli, 26 3 a unanimous
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the seized evidence had
been properly admitted. 2 " Initially, the Court noted that the theoretical basis for the third party consent rule is that when premises
are jointly controlled each inhabitant has a right to consent which
is independent from that of other occupants.2 65 Proceeding from
this premise, the Court held that an objection by an individual
does not vitiate the consent of a co-occupant,2 6 since by granting
another control over the premises, an individual has either as151
Id. at

288-89, 397 N.E.2d at 1320, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 653. The Court, though stating

that the apartment was shared on a "part-time" basis, did not elaborate on the amount of
time spent there by Hennessey. See note 269 infra.
257 48 N.Y.2d at 289, 397 N.E.2d at 1320, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
25 Id. at 289, 397 N.E.2d at 1321, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
259

Id.

260 Id. at 289, 397 N.E.2d at 1321, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
201 Id. at 289-90, 397 N.E.2d at 1321, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
216263 App. Div. 2d 1123, 405 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (1st Dep't 1978) (mem.).
263 Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Jasen, Jones, Wachtler, Fuchsberg and Meyer joined

with Judge Gabrielli.
2" 48 N.Y.2d at 292-93, 397 N.E.2d at 1323, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 655-56.
265 Id. at 291-92, 397 N.E.2d at 1321-22, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 654-55.
266Id. at 292-93, 397 N.E.2d at 1322-23, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 655-56. The Court indicated

that the defendant's protests upon being handcuffed prior to the search did not necessarily
constitute a refusal to consent thereto. Id. at 290, 397 N.E.2d at 1321, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 654.
It was concluded, however, that even an explicit refusal by the defendant to consent to the
search would have been ineffective to invalidate Hennessey's consent. Id.
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sumed the risk of consent or reduced his expectation of privacy.2 67
In either case, the Court concluded, the individual cannot prevent
a search when the valid consent of a co-occupant has been obtained. 268 Applying this reasoning to the case at bar, the Court
ruled that Hennessey possessed "the requisite degree of control" to
give rise to an independent right to consent to the search," 9 and
consequently, any objection by Cosine was ineffective to prevent
the search or render the seized evidence inadmissible. °
It is suggested that the Cosme Court's decision that one occupant's consent to a warrantless search is valid despite the protests
of his co-occupant is a logical extension of prior cases upholding
the validity of a third party's consent. 1 It is well established that
a party who possesses control of premises has a vested, independent right to consent to a search of those premises. 2 72 Since this
right is personal to each party and independent of that possessed
by others with like authority, a subsequent objection by one cooccupant to a warrantless search conducted pursuant to consent
from another co-occupant has been held to be ineffective to invalidate the search. 27 - By logical extension, therefore, a contemporaneous objection also should be ineffective. 4
267

Id. at 292, 397 N.E.2d at 1322, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 655.

268

Id.

269

Id. at 292, 397 N.E.2d at 1323, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 655. In holding that Hennessey

possessed the "requisite degree of control" over the premises, the Court relied on the finding
below that she had equal access to and use of both the apartment and the bedroom closet.
Id.
170 Id. at 292-93, 397 N.E.2d at 1323, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 655-56. Having concluded that
Hennessey's consent was sufficient to legitimize the search, it was unnecessary for the Court
to examine whether another recognized exception to the rule barring warrantless searches
was applicable. Id. at 293, 397 N.E.2d at 1323, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
I7 See, e.g., People v. Wood, 31 N.Y.2d 975, 293 N.E.2d 559, 341 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1973);
People v. Carter, 30 N.Y.2d 281, 283 N.E.2d 746, 332 N.Y.S.2d 865 (1972).
2172United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974); United States v. Stone, 471 F.2d 170,
173 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973); People v. Carter, 30 N.Y.2d 281, 283
N.E.2d 746, 332 N.Y.S.2d 865 (1972); see W. RINGEL, supra note 251, § 9.5(c), at 9-25.
I78 See, e.g., People v. Wood, 31 N.Y.2d 975, 293 N.E.2d 559, 341 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1973)
(per curiam); People v. Carter, 30 N.Y.2d 281, 283 N.E.2d 746, 332 N.Y.S.2d 865 (1972).
174 See Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 61-62
(1974); White, The Fourth Amendment As A Way of Talking About People: A Study of
Robinson and Matlock, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 165, 222; cf. United States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d
684 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978) (third party consent valid although
obtained subsequent to defendant's refusal to consent); People v. Dolan, 95 Misc. 2d 470,
408 N.Y.S.2d 249 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1978) (seizure of blood samples valid when consent given by hospital personnel even though defendant had refused to submit to separate
blood test). It has been observed that since a co-occupant has a personal, individual right to
consent to a warrantless search, the defendant's protests cannot serve to invalidate consent

1980]

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

The Cosme Court expressly left open the efficacy of third
party consent in cases where either the consenting individual "enjoys less than unrestricted access to and control over the premises
to be searched" or a co-occupant consents to a search of a specific
area of the jointly-controlled premises which another co-occupant
has reserved for his exclusive use. 7 It is submitted, however, that
validating a consensual search in either circumstance would be inconsistent with the underlying premises of the third party consent
rule. Where the consenting party's access to or use of part or all of
the premises is restricted in some manner, the authority which
gives rise to the right to consent is absent. 7 8 Extending the applithat was independent of his authority. See Weinreb, supra, at 62. See also W. RINoEL,
supra note 251, § 9.5(c), at 9-25; Wefing & Miles, Consent Searches and the Fourth Amendment: Voluntariness and Third Party Problems, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 211, 269 (1974).
In United States v. Sumlin, the defendant contended that his co-occupant's consent to
the warrantless search of a jointly-used apartment was invalid because it was obtained after
the defendant had refused to consent to the search. 567 F.2d at 686-87. In upholding the
validity of the third party's consent, the Sumlin court minimized the significance of the
Supreme Court's reference in Matlock to the absence of the nonconsenting party. Id. at 688;
see United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1973); note 253 supra. Noting that the
Matlock defendant had just been arrested in the front yard of the house when the third
party's consent was procured, the Sumlin court interpreted Matlock as focusing on whether
consent was obtained from a third party possessing common control over the premises to
the search. 567 F.2d at 687-88. Where such consent has been obtained, the court concluded,
the defendant possessed no reasonable expectation of privacy and hence his objection to the
search was irrelevant. Id. at 688.
2 5 48 N.Y.2d at 293 n.2, 397 N.E.2d at 1328 n.2, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 655 n.2. The Cosine
Court apparently recognized that a person may give others a right of access to his property
but limit the exercise of that right. See id. For example, maintenance personnel may be
provided with a key to the premises but with the expectation that it will be used only at a
particular time or for a particular purpose. Similarly, property as a whole may be shared but
with a specific area set aside for the exclusive use of one occupant.
276 See United States v. Mojica, 442 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curiam); United States
v. Kellerman, 431 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970); People v. Wood, 31
N.Y.2d 975, 293 N.E.2d 559, 341 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1973) (per curiam).
Both the Cosine and Matlock decisions relied upon the theory that the person who
permitted the search did so in his own right, and that this right derived from his access to
and control of the property to a degree at least equal to that of the nonconsenting party.
See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 & n.7 (1974); People v. Cosine, 48 N.Y.2d
286, 291-92, 397 N.E.2d 1319, 1322, 422 N.Y.S.2d 652, 654-55 (1979). Where the consenting
party has less authority over the area in question than the nonconsenting occupant, however, it appears that the basis for allowing the former to consent would be absent. Thus, an
area or portion of the property over which the defendant has retained exclusive control
should be immune from a search authorized by a third party. See W. RINGEL, supra note
251, § 9.5(d), at 9-27. The Cosine Court's reliance on the fact that Hennessey had access to
both the apartment and the closet where the contraband was found, see 48 N.Y.2d at 292,
397 N.E.2d at 1323, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 655, appears to support this conclusion. Moreover, in
People v. Wood the Court stated that one who has exclusive possession and control over a
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cability of the third party consent rule to such situations, moreover, would jeopardize a co-occupant's reasonable expectation of
privacy. It is unrealistic to presume that a defendant assumed the
risk that a person whose use of the premises was circumscribed
could consent to a warrantless search. 2 Indeed, it appears that
the application of the third party consent rule beyond the limits
set forth in Cosme would undercut a defendant's fourth amendment rights based on his granting even a modicum of access or
control of his premises to another and would subvert the judicial
policy favoring use of search warrants. 27 a It is suggested, therefore,
that use of the third party consent rule be limited to situations
where the consenting party enjoys "unfettered access to and control over" the premises searched.
Peter McNamara
Use of defendant's silence at time of arrest for impeachment violates due process, despite absence of Miranda warnings
It is well established in New York that a defendant's silence
upon arrest may not be used by the prosecution in a criminal trial
premises cannot be subjected to a warrantless search of those premises based on the consent
of a third party. 31 N.Y.2d at 976, 293 N.E.2d at 559-60, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 311. Thus, it can
be concluded that a third party's consent would not validate a warrantless search of an area
used exclusively by a co-occupant.
It also appears that the consent of a third party would be invalid where the third party
has less access and control than the nonconsenting individual. See Stoner v. California, 376
U.S. 483 (1964). In Stoner, a warrantless search of a hotel room was performed with the
consent of the management in the absence of the occupant. Id. at 484-85. While acknowledging that the defendant impliedly shared control of the room with the hotel management,
the Court held that the degree of control possessed by the hotel management was not sufficient to authorize consent to a police search. Id. at 488-90. It is logical to assume, therefore,
that if a third party with less control cannot validly consent to a search in the absence of
the occupant, he cannot do so in the presence of the occupant.
27' The doctrine of assumption of risk is based on the theory that the defendant voluntarily has chosen to encounter a risk that is both recognized and appreciated. See Bacigal,
Some Observations and Proposals on the Nature of the FourthAmendment, 46 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 529, 541 (1978). As applied to third party consent situations, it has been reasoned
that a willingness to share one's possession, use or control of property implies an assumption
of the risk that the joint user might allow a police search of the property. Id. at 548. See
also United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740
(1969).
28 See generally Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948);
United States v. Houle, 603 F.2d 1297, 1299 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Prescott, 599
F.2d 103, 105 (5th Cir. 1979); People v. Kreichman, 37 N.Y.2d 693, 697, 339 N.E.2d 182, 186,
376 N.Y.S.2d 497, 502 (1975); 2 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.1, at 3 (1978).

